In this paper we document the impact of immigration at the regional level on Europeans' political preferences as expressed by voting behavior in parliamentary or presidential elections between 2007 and 2016. We combine individual data on party voting with a classification of each party's political agenda on a scale of their "nationalistic" attitudes over 28 elections across 126 parties in 12 countries. To reduce immigrant selection and omitted variable bias, we use immigrant settlements in 2005 and the skill composition of recent immigrant flows as instruments. OLS and IV estimates show that larger inflows of highly educated immigrants were associated with a change in the vote of citizens away from nationalism. However the inflow of less educated immigrants was positively associated with a vote shift towards nationalist positions. These effects were stronger for non-tertiary educated voters and in response to non-European immigrants. We also show that they are consistent with the impact of immigration on individual political preferences, which we estimate using longitudinal data, and on opinions about immigrants. Conversely, immigration did not affect electoral turnout. Simulations based on the estimated coefficients show that immigration policies balancing the number of high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants from outside the EU would be associated with a shift in votes away from nationalist parties in almost all European regions.
tackling the question of what determines natives' attitudes towards high/low-skilled immigrants and how this depends on their education level. Their findings, based on data from a survey of 2,285 people, show that neither labor market competition nor fiscal competition explains those attitudes well. In fact, more educated natives have more positive attitudes towards both types of immigrants, relative to less educated natives. This is at odds with the idea that individuals are more opposed to immigrants with similar labor market skills.
Moreover they find that richer people are more in favor of immigrants than poorer people, and this is even stronger if they live in states with more redistribution. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) argue that economic self-interest does not motivate the vote, rather the perception of what is good for society does. This would explain the more favorable opinion for high-skilled immigrants who, arguably, have a larger positive effect on the overall economy and society. An alternative "cultural" explanation, in which tolerance and preference for cultural diversity is associated with more education, is also consistent with those findings. Card et al. (2012) show that the individual "cultural" assessment of immigrants drives overall opinion towards immigration policies while the economic evaluations of their contribution is less relevant. Poutvaara and Steinhardt (2018) show that the individual perception of not having what one deserves in life is strongly associated with worries about immigration, particularly among the low-skilled.
A more recent strand of the literature has directly tested the link between immigration and the electoral vote. The specific question asked in several papers is whether an increased inflow of immigrants affected the vote of natives and in what direction. The common observation of higher immigration flows and growing electoral consensus for anti-immigration parties has driven scholars to ask to what extent does the first determines the second. This effect requires that changes in the local presence of immigrants either change attitudes for (at least) some part of the native population or change their willingness to vote. Whatever is their initial attitude towards immigrants, natives either become more concerned with this issue and more aware that this is relevant to them (i.e., the issue gains salience) or they change their opinion of immigrants in response to their inflow. In line with the literature on "political persuasion" (e.g. Della Vigna and Gentzkow, 2009 ), some groups may revise their view of immigrants in a Bayesian updating (contact theory, prevalence of personal experience). In this process, individuals acquire "new information" from meeting or interacting with immigrants or being exposed to news related to them in their local community. This may change their vote, and the platform of elected parties in terms of immigration policies would reflects such a shift. In this A series of recent studies has taken this approach focusing on how immigration has changed the political landscape in individual countries, especially in terms of votes to populist/nationalistic parties.
1 These studies considered individual countries and asked whether an increase in immigrant share at the local level was associated with an increase in the vote for specific anti-immigration parties 2 . Each of these papers is focused 1 A recent literature looks at other economic determinants of the increase in the share of populist vote in many European countries. Algan et al. (2017) , for instance analyzes how the intensity of the Great Recession has affected such votes.
2 Specifically, Otto and Steinhardt (2014) analyze the effect of immigration on the vote for the German People Union in Hamburg. Barone et al. (2016) look at immigration and vote to the center-right/northern league coalition in Italy. Halla et al. (2017) look at votes to the Freedom Party of Austria. Harmon (2017) look at cultural distance of immigrants and vote for the Danish People Party in Denmark. Brunner and Kuhn (2018) analyze the vote to the Swiss People Party in Switzerland. Edo et al. (2017) look at the French vote for the "Front National" in France. Finally Mayda et al. (2018) show that in the US high-skilled immigration has been strongly associated with a higher share of Democratic vote and low-skilled immigration with a higher share of Republican vote. on a specific country or city, and they use historical location of immigrants and a shift-share instrumentalvariable approach to identify the effect of immigrants on the vote. The specific national context is a limitation of these papers as the generalization of the findings can be problematic. However, taken together, these studies present rather robust evidence of different voting responses to high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants. An increase in the immigrant population share in a region/municipality is associated with a shift of the vote towards right-wing nationalist parties. Instead, focusing on the effect of highly skilled immigrants only (those with some tertiary education), one finds a shift of native votes away from right-wing nationalistic parties.
This second finding seems as strong as the first on low-skilled immigrants, although not as much emphasized.
This observation is the point of departure of our present paper which generalizes the analysis of immigration and voting behavior by homogenizing data for all parties and all elections in 12 European countries.
In order to address more directly the connection between the votes to a party and its policy platform, we introduce an innovation in this literature. We classify each party on a common scale in terms of the intensity of their "nationalism". We quantify nationalism using a textual analysis of their political agenda as stated in their Manifesto (using data from the Manifesto Project Database). We merge this measure of the average nationalism of parties to the information about what party an individual voted in the previous election, from the European Social Survey, for a large and representative sample of EU citizens in 12 countries. We use this information to construct a panel of votes in 28 European elections, and we merge it (using the European Labor Force Survey) with the change in high and low-skilled immigrants as share of adult population measured for each European region. Our main specification analyzes how the change in local immigrants was associated to the revealed "nationalism" of voters in EU regions.
In order to go beyond correlations we use the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001 ) to predict, separately, high-skilled and low-skilled immigration based on the location of immigrants by area of birth in 2005 and the growth of each national group by skill level. The differentiation in country of origin and skill intensities of groups allows us to estimate two separate effects for skilled and unskilled immigrants. While the variation in the inflow of high and low-skilled immigrants is not random across counties, the use of our instrument and the inclusion of a rich set of fixed effects and controls should reduce concerns about omitted variable bias.
We base our instrument on the immigrant distribution in 2005 and test that the instrument is not correlated to previous changes in demographic and economic variables in the period 2000-05. This mitigates potential bias from correlations between pre-trends of the shift-share instrument and existing trends (e.g. Jaeger et al., 2018 ).
An additional contribution of our paper is that by combining datasets, we can analyze different outcomes: the impact of immigration on votes as captured by elections, on individual party preferences as revealed in surveys and on individual attitudes towards immigrants (also obtained from the European Social Survey).
This analysis, therefore, connects the studies that analyze immigration and individual attitudes (such as Hanson et al., 2007 or Hatton, 2016 , on refugees and asylum policies) with those analyzing immigration and voting behavior (e.g. Halla et al., 2017; Barone et al., 2016) . Moreover, by looking at the impact of immigrants on vote turnout, we can discuss whether a change in individual attitudes or a change in voting participation is the more likely channel for the aggregate effect of immigration on the political success of "nationalistic" parties.
Our main findings are three. First, we find a strong negative correlation of highly educated immigrants as share of the population and intensity of nationalist preferences in the parties voted by citizens. We also find an opposite and similar positive association of the population share of less skilled immigrants and voted parties' nationalist preferences. Second, we find that the change in preferences in response to high and low-skilled immigrant share is stronger for less educated citizen voters than for highly educated citizen voters. It is also stronger for older voters than younger voters. This is consistent with the idea that people with less previous exposure to immigrants respond more significantly to their presence, both in positive and negative terms.
Third, we find that average changes in voting behavior do not derive from changes in participation rates of different groups but are instead consistent with changes in individual opinion, both in vote preferences and in the attitudes towards immigrants. In particular, an increase in low-skilled immigrants moves individual's vote and attitudes towards opinions and parties that are more "nationalistic".
A possible interpretation of these results is that individuals have only weak preferences on immigration policies, or weak priors on the desirability of immigrants, and when they interact with them at the local level they revise these preferences, in the light of their local experience. If this is the case, the results seem to indicate that interactions with highly educated immigrants bring individual to revise their preferences in favor of them. However, interactions with less educated immigrants may produce the opposite effect. This revision of priors or updating of preferences implies that changes in individual preferences affect political opinions. A recent paper by Alesina et al. (2018) analyzes how individual views about immigration affect the preference of citizens for redistribution. The paper shows, interestingly, that less educated people in sectors with high immigrant competition tend to overestimate the presence and the cost of immigrants. This effect is also associated with higher demand for redistribution. That paper shows a larger mis-perception of less educated citizens about the cost and salience of immigrants. This could be a reason for the larger pro-nationalist effect of low-skilled immigration on this group that we find in our analysis.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the data and specifically we document the intensity of nationalistic preferences in recent elections and the increase in immigrants as share of resident population. In Section 3 we present the empirical strategy first and then a simple decomposition that allows us to analyze the impact of immigration on individual opinions and turnout. In Section 4 we discuss the baseline results on immigration and nationalist voting. In Section 5 we present our results by exploiting individual level heterogeneity. In Section 6 we decompose the channels of nationalist voting behavior focusing on individual opinion and turnout. In Section 7, we present some scenarios that simulate the potential effect on vote of different immigration flows. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Data and Summary Statistics
An important innovation of this paper is the construction of an index of political nationalism based on each party's ideology and agenda. We built on four different datasets. Our primary data source is the European Social Survey (ESS). This is a multi-country survey, which was administered in 8 waves (one every two years) in 36 countries between 2002 and 2016. The ESS selects a random sample of individuals that is representative of the population over 18 in each country. On average, each wave contains around 1500 individuals for each country. The data include detailed information on personal and family characteristics such as age, gender, education, marital status, number of children in the family, place of birth and labor market characteristics 3 Alternative explanation would be that people's opinion on immigrants (either positive or negative) do not change much, but the presence of immigrants makes the issue more salient for some groups of natives and pushes them to vote in response to such an issue. In this case high-skilled immigration may encourage the more pro-immigrant groups to vote, while low-skilled immigrants may push to vote the more nationalist. In our analysis however we find that differential change in participation to the vote by different groups does not seem to be a relevant channel for the aggregate effects.
such as employment status and work characteristics. It also includes detailed information on the parental background, such as parents' education, employment status, occupation when the respondent was 14 years old and their country of birth.
ESS data report also two specific questions on voting and political preferences of individuals: (i) "which party did you vote in the last national election? ", and (ii) "which party do you feel close to? ". The answers to those questions are the actual names of the parties in each surveyed country, which we link to information on the political agenda of these parties, available from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD). This dataset describes the political manifesto of 1093 parties over 715 parliamentary elections.
4 Each party's political agenda is studied through a content analysis of its political manifesto: the share of quasi-sentences related to a topic as a fraction of all sentences in the whole political manifesto is taken as a measure of the relevance of that topic for that party. For each topic the MPD identifies two measures: one of favorable/positive mentions of the topic, and the other of unfavorable/negative mentions. This prompts the construction of two measures. The first one is a measure of salience of the topic in the political agenda of the party. This is computed as the sum of the mentions (both positive and negative) related to the topic relative to total quasi-sentences. The second one is a measure of party preferences on the topic, computed as the difference between positive and negative mentions relative to total quasi-sentences. Several topics are analyzed, such as protectionism, the role of traditional morality, civic mindedness, multiculturalism and several others. In our analysis we focus on parties' political preferences on: (i) European Community/Union and (ii) National way of life. The former takes into account all mentions on the EU like the desirability/opposition of expanding the EU or increasing EU competences. The latter contains all mentions of nationalism, patriotism, pride of citizenship, etc. We compute the average over time of those indicators for each party, 5 and we consider those averages as the measures of "salience" and "intensity" for that party on each specific issue. We then combine the two topics (EU and national way of life) using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) summarizing the Salience and the Intensity of political parties on what we call "nationalism", which correlates negatively with favorable mentions of EU variable and positively with favorable mentions of the national way of life.
Results of the PCA are available in the on-line Appendix II. Finally, we harmonize and link this index with the voting/political preferences of individual from ESS. In the main part of the analysis, we exploit within region variation over time in voting behaviors between consecutive elections.
ESS data report information on regional location of respondents within a country at NUTS2 level for all EU countries with few exceptions (e.g. Austria, Germany, UK) where it is at NUTS1 level. 6 We use this information to attach to each ESS respondent the number of migrants in the region of residence in a given year. 
where m O r,s,t is the share of migrants and M O r,s,t is the total stock of migrants in NUTS2 region r born in the group of origin countries O ∈ {All, N on EU 28, EU 28}, with skills s ∈ {All, HS, LS} at time t.
Combining individual ESS country samples with EULFS migration data and MPD data on political agenda of parties, we obtain information on 12 European countries for the 2007-2016 period. The countries in our final sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and United Kingdom. For these countries, we build origin-skill specific shares of migrants at the regional level.
8 The sample covers 114 regions; for these regions we also extract from Eurostat and OECD sources regional data on GDP per capita, population density, unemployment rate, percentage of tertiary educated individuals, value of social benefits other than social transfer in kind per capita, the ratio 0-14 over 15-65 years old population and a measure of total number of crimes.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Our final sample includes countries for which ESS data cover at least two national elections. The main identifying variation in our empirical analysis is the within region changes in voting behaviors over different elections.
10 Table 1 reports the number and year of elections covered by ESS questions for each country in columns (1) and (2) and the number and years of the surveys in columns (3) and (4). In our main dataset we focus on individual votes at the latest elections, and hence we only use variation between elections, even if the ESS was conducted more than once between elections. For instance, in the case of France, we exploit variation in voting behaviors between French national election years in 2007 and 2012 (see column (2) in Table 1 ), even if the ESS survey was conducted in years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 (see column (4) ). In this specification we pool the individual data in repeated representative cross sections. By including a region fixed effect, we treat them as a region-level pseudo panel.
Alternatively, we use the data to construct a genuine longitudinal dataset at the individual level. For each individual we consider as one data point the party preference expressed at the time of the survey which is available each survey year. We then consider as another data point the party she/he voted for at the last election. Hence, we have two observations for each individual, over time, and we can use these data to analyze the individual evolution of party preference in a longitudinal approach and controlling for individual fixed effects. Table A2 in the on-line appendix provides descriptive statistics for the sample of individuals who reveals their current party preference. Table A3 provides a measure of differences in terms of political preferences between the party voted at the last national elections and the currently preferred party. On average 16% of the sampled individuals changed party preference between the last national election and the year of the survey. While the database using repeated cross-section of electoral votes will be used to perform 8 Germany provides information on the total stock of the foreign born population, but not on their birthplace. We use information on the nationality of immigrants instead to impute the birthplace of the foreign born population.
9 An extended data section is available in the on-line Appendix I and 19% of respondents have a father with tertiary education. On average, the party for which these individuals voted included 3.2% of their sentences mentioning the EU and 1.5% mentioning issues related to the national way. These measures reveal how salient these issues were for the electorate. On average, the mention about the EU were positive (1.6% is the positive minus negative incidence) and also about national way of life (1.2% is the net average positive incidence of mentions of national way of life). We construct the indicators of party preferences for the EU and a national way of life to obtain synthetic indicators of nationalism and its salience. These are obtained from principal component analyses performed on the indicators of preferences for EU and nationalism, and the salience of these two, respectively. There is a very strong negative correlation between EU preferences and national way of life preferences, so the first principal component of the two captures a very large fraction of common variance. This is what we call "nationalism" and we standardize the index so that a one-unit change corresponds to one standard deviation. Then, the lower part of Table 2 shows some summary statistics of variables measured at the regional (NUTS2) level. Focusing on the presence of immigrants, the average share (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) of extra-EU immigrants in the considered sample was equal to 7.1% of the population and it was larger than the population share of EU immigrants (5.9% of the population). low-skilled immigrants account for about three fourths of total migrant population (9.7% vs. 3.3% of total population in the region). The significant inflow of low-skilled immigrants and their recent presence are considered by some an important element in the rise of the nationalistic parties in Europe.
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE] Our electoral data originate from the ESS and we use them to evaluate individual voting. Hence, we check whether the aggregate vote shares for the most important parties at the national level, calculated using our dataset, correspond to the official figures reported in the elections. We use the European Election Database (EED), which is the most reliable source for this type of information, to measure the party vote shares at elections. Figure 1 , panel (a) plots the total share of votes to the top three parties for each national election obtained using ESS data (vertical axis) against the same share obtained from the EED (horizontal axis).
Panel (b) performs the same exercise, focusing on share of votes received in each election-country by the top five parties.
11 As there may be measurement error in the ESS, we would like to check if there is systematic under or over measurement of votes going to the top parties in the analyzed election. Figure 1 shows that country-election observations are close to the 45 degree line, which would imply exact same measure from the two sources. The departures are relatively small, sometimes positive and sometimes negative, and they show no specific pattern. This reassures us that the distribution of votes recorded in the ESS is close to the 11 Table A4 in the on-line appendix shows the results in terms of differences between ESS and EED for each election for the top 5 parties. Considering the whole set of elections, the average difference between the two datasets is small (about 0.63% on average). over the total population, following the same timing of the available elections. Overall, we notice a positive upward trend, which is steeper for highly educated immigrants. Notice, however that low educated immigrant share of the population is almost double than the high educated immigrants population. Comparing Figure   6 and Figure 7 we can intuitively point out a common trend, which is interesting but far from proving any causation.
Empirical Specification and Identification
In this section we present our basic empirical approach to investigate the impact of immigration on nationalism of EU citizens as revealed by their vote. As key explanatory variable we include, in the basic specification, the adult population share of more and less educated immigrants. As our goal is to focus on how immigrants may change the vote of EU citizens, we only include natives' voting as outcome. This eliminates the direct effect of naturalized immigrants on voting. We define as N ation i,r,e the normalized value of nationalism index (first principal component of favorable mentions towards EU and national way of life) voted by native citizen i in region r (NUTS2) in election e. In our basic specification, we allow additional individual and regional characteristics to affect individual preferences, in addition to our main variables of interest. The basic specification is as follows:
r,e + ζX i,r,e + γΓ r,e + θ e + η r + i,r,e .
The two variables of interest are m 14 The vector X i,r,e contains a set of individual characteristics of voter i including age, gender and whether the individual is tertiary educated. The vector Γ r,e contains a set of NUTS2 regional characteristics of region r including the level of GDP per capita, population density, unemployment rate and percentage of tertiary educated individuals. We also capture fixed regional factors, such as institutions and local culture, with regional fixed effects η r , while aggregate trends through elections can be captured by the election fixed effects
Estimating equation (2) using OLS produces a measure of the partial correlation between the high and lowskilled immigration share and natives' voting preferences. The estimates of coefficients β H and β L will capture such correlations. However, it is likely that individual and regional unobserved characteristics captured by i,r,e may be correlated with natives' voting preferences and may also affect new immigrants location decision. If this is case, the OLS estimation will be a biased estimate of the causal effect of immigration on votes. To mitigate this potential bias, we use an instrumental variable approach based on a variation of the widely used shift-share methodology (see Card, 2001 , Mayda et al., 2018 . The intuition of this instrumental variable approach is to use past location of immigrants by country of origin as predictor of subsequent inflow of immigrants, as uncorrelated (or less correlated) with current factors affecting vote and political preferences of individuals. The changes in aggregate flows of immigrants across countries of origin, likely driven by aggregate push factors, are allocated to EU regions according to the early distribution of immigrants. Hence such a shift-share or "enclave" instrument generates variation of regional migration over time due to the interaction between previously established immigrants settlement and aggregate national flows. Both those components are likely to be less correlated with economic and political region-specific changes than the actual migrant flows and this should reduce the severity of the omitted variable bias. We will also test the correlation of such an instrument with the pre-period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) economic and demographic regional trends. This will reduce worries of pre-trend correlations, and hence of potential endogeneity and omitted variables bias, if persistent trends are correlated with immigration. These checks would significantly reduce the worries raised in recent criticism of this kind of IV strategy (see Jaeger et al., 2018 and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018) .
A novel aspect of our analysis, as we want to capture skill-specific effects of immigration, is the construction of two different instrumental variables taking into account the aggregate variation of immigrant flows by skill, and applying it to the same pre-period distribution of immigrants, by origin, across regions. 
where M EULFS, in its harmonized codification scheme, grouped the origin countries in 15 groups that we use as "countries" of origin.
16 Then, we compute the total stocks of migrants resident in the EU 12 countries, born in countries of origin c in each year t ∈ {2007, 2008, ..., 2016} separately for two skill levels s equal to H, for college educated and to L. Namely we compute:
We can then predict the total number (stock) of immigrants of skill s, origin c in region r and year t as the interaction (product) of those two values, as follows:
We sum across all countries of origin and standardize for the initial total population in region r to have the predicted skilled and unskilled immigrant as share of the population in region r and year y as follows:
We will use these imputed shares as instrumental variables for each skill level H and L. The prediction power of our IVs for each skill will depend on the tendency of that group to locate where previous immigrants from the same origin did. The pre-period distribution across regions by country of origin is not skill specific, as to avoid correlation with regional features that would select high or low-skilled workers. In this way, the independent variation of the two instrument is only generated by the differential aggregate flows of immigrants by skill from the same country of origin.
Instrumental variables based on the shift-share methodology have been used before to explore the relation between immigration and voting (see e.g. Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Mendez and Cutillas, 2014; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Halla et al., 2017; Barone et al., 2016) . They have also been subject to a fair amount of discussion Both shocks were large and independent of previous regional conditions, hence uncorrelated with past shocks.
Hence, these large aggregate shocks may have reduced the correlation of the instruments and unobserved regional factors. Table 3 
Allowing heterogeneity across individuals and regions
We explore two important sources of heterogeneity in the effects of immigrants on native vote. First, different types of citizens, especially in terms of education levels, may respond differently to the inflow of immigrants.
As we discuss below, if immigration is an "event" that reveals information and may change the attitudes or the beliefs of citizens towards immigrants, it may have a different effect across groups of voters depending on their perceptions and priors. Pursuing this line of analysis, we split the native population by education (not tertiary and tertiary), age groups (18-37, 38-57 and 58+), location (rural, small town and cities) and gender.
18 We estimated equation (2) across different subsamples through the 2SLS estimation presented above.
Investigating the heterogeneous effects of immigrants on natives' voting behavior is one of the contributions of this paper.
Second, it is also interesting to analyze whether effects of immigration vary depending on region specific socio-economic characteristics. For instance, natives from regions with strong redistributive policies may perceive more competition on the welfare system from low educated immigrants and shift their vote towards nationalist platforms. At the regional level we focus on the importance of the welfare system (see Otto and Steinhardt, 2014 and Becker and Fetzer, 2017) , children education (see Halla et al., 2017) and the local crime rate (see Mendez and Cutillas, 2014) . These specific features affect local public goods (local government, schooling, policing) that could be crowded or depleted, in the view of natives, by less educated immigrants or, possibly, helped by highly educated immigrants. Definingφ 2010 the median value of the regional characteristic in 2010, we estimate with 2SLS the following equation:
r,e 1(φ r,2010 <φ 2010 ) + ζX i,r,e + γΓ r,e + θ e + η r + i,r,e .
The estimated parametersβ s 1 andβ s 2 are respectively the impact of the share of s ∈ {H, L} skilled immigrants in region r at election e on individual voting preferences in the regions above and below the median of the regional characteristic considered indicated as φ. To test the effect across different levels of welfare system, we compute as a proxy the social benefits other than social transfer in kind per capita. Halla and that could influence voting preferences of parents who are worried about the education of their children.
We test this second channel by looking at the ratio of children to adults at the regional level. Finally, the crime level across regions is computed as the total number of crimes, including robberies, homicides, burglaries and thefts.
Decomposing the effect: turnout and voting preferences
The reduced form structure of equation (2) does not allow us to identify the channels that connect migration with natives' voting behavior. To examine potential mechanisms, we think of the inflow of immigrants as an "event" that takes place in a local area. We can think of it as providing exposure of local voters to immigrants. This "event" may produce a change in vote by affecting individual attitudes towards immigrants.
The interaction with migrants and/or getting local news about them produces a negative/positive revision of the degree of individual nationalism. An "event" that implies contact with (or coverage of) immigrants perceived as enriching and helping the area would likely generate a reduction in nationalism. An event which implies contact/interactions with immigrants perceived as not contributing positively to the local area, may result in an increase in nationalism.
In addition, an increase in immigrants may contribute to make "immigration" a more salient issue in the voting decisions of some groups. In this sense, immigrants' presence may not only affect the nationalistic view of a person but also make it more likely that those views are turned into vote. If people reinforce their nationalist views, they may act upon it and vote for parties whose agenda is more nationalist (antiimmigrants) and for which this dimension is more salient. This channel has been emphasized by studies that show that attitudes are not easy to change but events, information and news may change the willingness to act upon these attitudes with one's vote (see Barone et al., 2015) .
Let's define two groups s and u with different average preferences for the intensity of "nationalism" of their elected officials. These groups can be thought as the group of skilled and unskilled citizens, but they may also be sub-groups of those. Standardizing n, an indicator of nationalist intensity, to be between 0 and 1, we label the two groups so that u has "initial" or "basic" preferences that are more nationalistic than group s. This implies at period t=0: 0 ≤ n 0 s < 0.5 < n 0 u ≤ 1. Next, we define a revision of average preferences for each group as a function of the local change in high and low-skilled immigrants as shares of the population. This variable proxies the change in likelihood/frequency of interactions of the local population with immigrants and/or the change in intensity of local news related to them. Hence, the preferences of natives in period t=1 may change as a result of immigrants' flow to a region. This is captured by the following relation:
In equation (6), the function f j (., .) captures the extent to which the average person of group j revised her position in terms of nationalism, as a consequence of being exposed to a change in skilled (s m ) and unskilled
It is plausible to think that an increased probability of interaction with skilled immigrants would allow citizens to revise their priors towards less nationalism. Contact theory predicts that people fear less what they know (see e.g. McLaren, 2003) and highly skilled immigrants are likely to be perceived as contributing citizens. They are likely to work and unlikely to be involved in "negative news stories" about crime or cultural differences. In that case, the derivative of the function with respect to skilled immigrant change would be negative i.e f j,sm < 0. Instead, stereotypical thinking may induce natives to attribute local social cohesion or economic problems to the presence of low-skilled immigrants. These immigrants may be perceived to be less likely to work, thus net receivers from local economy and welfare. They may also be more likely to be in local negative news stories, even if it is only a very small percentage of them. In this case, a larger inflow of low-skilled may produce a revision in favor of nationalistic views (f j,um > 0). A recent paper by Alesina et al. (2018) shows that people in many countries tend to exaggerate the share of immigrants and the share of non-educated ones in the population. They also show that for some groups, such as less educated exposed to large immigration in their occupations, this distortion in perception is even stronger.
The extent of the revisions in nationalistic opinions may vary from group to group depending on several features of the groups. If the reason for the revision is a Bayesian updating of the assessment of immigrants and their contributions, then groups who are initially less informed and aware of immigrants and their role would have larger revisions. Existing literature (e.g. Della Vigna and Gentzkow, 2009) suggests that this can be the case for less educated people. These individuals might respond to the immigration "event" and adjust their nationalism level, both in positive or in negative, more than educated citizens. Alternatively, if the revision is driven by confirmation bias (so that signal confirming our beliefs have a stronger effect), groups who are more nationalistic to begin with will respond to immigrants' inflow, especially low-skilled one, increasing their nationalism. These groups will not reduce their nationalism much in response to high-skilled immigration instead.
The preferences of individuals are not the only relevant component when we consider the vote. The other crucial factor is the probability of actually going to vote, measured by the turnout. This can also be affected by the change in skilled or unskilled immigrants, which affects the "salience" of the immigration topic on deciding whether voting or not. So calling δ j ∆sm P op , ∆um P op for j = s, u the probability of voting of individuals of group j, we can analyze the impact of immigration on the probability of voting. This is an important measure of whether being reminded of the presence of immigrants by more frequent interactions affects the probability of translating one's preference into vote.
The synthetic index of political nationalism is produced by aggregating the voting behavior and turnout of the two groups of individuals, weighted by their relative population. We standardize the index to one and denote by S and 1 − S for skilled and unskilled, respectively:
Immigration affects the index through the turnout channel and through the individual preference channel, and each channel can be specific to a group. Using our data we will be able to investigate these channels by estimating separately how the turnout of each individual group (high and low-skilled) is affected by nationalism, and how their preferences are affected too.
In terms of turnout channel we can estimate the following:
The main regressors in equation (8) is analogous to equation (2) The second channel discussed in equation (7) is the change in individual preferences. The information available from the ESS allows to gain some insight over this channel too, by looking also at longitudinal changes in party preferences.
19 Defining N ation π c i,r,t the normalized level of nationalism of the party π c preferred by voter i in region r at year t and N ation π i,r,t−1 the normalized level of nationalism of the party π voted in election year t − 1, we can then compute:
that is the variation of the level of nationalism for individual i capturing preference shift, independent from participation to vote. Using equation (9) as our dependent variable we can perform an individual panel analysis (both with Least Squares and 2SLS) with the following equation:
where ∆m s r,t and ∆Γ r,t are respectively the variation of the migration share and regional characteristics of region r between the year t and the year of the last election t−1. The variable ∆Y ear i,r,t captures the number of years between the year of last election (t − 1) and the year (t) when the individual reveals his preferred party. This should correspond to a linearization of function f j in equation (7). Let us emphasize that the individual panel analysis fully controls for individual characteristics, avoiding the potential omitted variable bias at the individual level and bypassing the issue of change/selection into vote participation because it includes all people who voted in the early election independently of their later participation. Poutvaara and Steinhardt (2018) is the only paper that we know of that exploits variation in individual preferences over time. However, that study looks at the effect of "bitterness" on attitudes towards migration in Germany, while we analyze the effect of local migration on individual voting across the Europe. Table 4 presents our baseline results. The reported coefficients capture the impact of immigrants as share of the population on the intensity of nationalism in local electoral outcomes. We report a first set of estimates for all migrants in the sample (top panel), and two additional sets of results where we focus on migrants from non-EU origins (middle panel) and migrants from EU origins (bottom panel). For each set of estimates, we run different specifications by OLS and IV. In columns (1) and (2), the share of total immigrants relative to the total population of residents in 2005 is the main regressor. Then, we focus on the immigrant share of high-skilled (columns (3) and (4)) and on the immigrant share of low-skilled (columns (5) and (6)), respectively. In columns (7) and (8), we include both shares of high-skilled and low-skilled in the same regression.
Main Results
All specifications include NUTS2 regional dummies, election year fixed effects, plus regional and individual controls.
[INSERT Table 4 HERE] The F-stat of the first stage (reported in the table for all IV estimates) shows that the shift share instrument has significant power. However, when the two shares (high and low-skilled) are included together as explanatory variables and instrumented, the F-stat deteriorates significantly and drops below 10. This is likely an effect of the high correlation between the IV for high and low skills. The OLS and IV estimated coefficients are qualitatively consistent with each other in all specifications. Baseline estimates in the top panel of Table 4 suggest that, on average, a higher share of immigrants among residents encourages citizens to vote for more nationalistic policy agendas in the elections.
20 However, when separating the effect of the shares of low-and high-skilled immigrants, we see a clear and significant difference. A higher share of lowskilled immigrants is associated with votes for more intense nationalistic agendas. Conversely, a higher share of high-skilled migrants is associated with vote for less nationalistic agendas 21 . The coefficients are more precisely estimated for the low-skilled than the high-skilled migrant shares, particularly when it comes to IV estimates. The size of the coefficients is larger under IV compared with OLS estimations. This suggests IV corrects for omitted factors that produce an attenuation bias in OLS estimates. 22 Estimates in the middle and bottom panel of Table 4 show that not only skills, but also migrants' origins matter. The positive effect of low-skilled migrant shares on nationalist voting seems mostly driven by migrants from extra EU countries (see IV estimates in columns 6 and 8). The anti-nationalist voting effect of skilled migration is similar for migrants coming from EU and non-EU countries, but more precisely estimated for the former compared to the latter group.
We can evaluate the economic magnitude of these effects by using the estimated marginal effect of migration shares, together with the corresponding standard deviations reported in Table 2 . Taken at the their face value, IV estimates in column (8) top panel of Table 4 indicate that one standard deviation increase in the share of low-skilled migrants (6.1 percentage points) shifts voting of individuals towards a more nationalist agenda by 0.73(= 6.1 * 0.12) standard deviation of the nationalism indicator. This is a sizable effect, almost equivalent to the distance in the nationalist policy pursued by a party belonging to the Socialist family (-0.29) and a Confessional (0.55) family. The magnitude of the negative effect of one standard deviation increase of the share of high-skilled migrants on nationalist voting is smaller. This is due to the fact that skilled immigration and its variation was small across European regions, so that a similar coefficient multiplies a smaller standard deviation. The effect is equal to −0.34(= 3.1 * (−0.11)) standard deviations. This anti-nationalist effect slightly increases, and is more precisely estimated, when we focus on EU skilled migration only. It 20 Our population of voters includes individuals that were born in the country of destination; i.e., also second and higher generation of migrants.
21 This result is consistent with the main finding of Mayda et al (2018) on US election. They find that an increase in skilled immigrants in the US reduces the percentage of votes to Republicans, while an increase in low skilled immigrants increases the Republican share of votes.
22 e.g. Low-skilled immigrants may decide not to go to European regions characterized by a high intensity of nationalist voting. Similarly, omitted economic or social factors at the regional level may determine both low immigration rates and pro-nationalist voting. We discuss the role of local regional conditions more in detail in Table 7 Table 5 analyzes whether the electoral vote response to immigrants also reveals a change in salience of nationalism in the party agenda. The estimates suggest that the effect of immigration on the index of salience of nationalism in voted parties is similar to the effect on intensity of nationalism itself. Low and high-skilled migration have opposite effects on salience, both when indicators are entered individually (in columns from (3) to (6)), and when the shares of low/high-skilled migrants are included together (in columns (7) and (8)). A higher share of low-skilled migrants makes nationalism a more salient topic among voted parties. Conversely, a higher share of high-skilled migrants reduces the salience of nationalism among voted parties. Signs of the coefficients are stable across specifications. As in the previous results, coefficients are larger in IV relative to OLS estimates. Estimates in the middle and bottom panel of Table 5 show that the negative effect of high-skilled migration is significant for both EU and non EU migrants, while the positive effect of low-skilled immigrants is more precisely estimated and somewhat larger for extra EU immigrants.
[INSERT Table 6 HERE]   Table 6 shows robustness of the main coefficients as estimated in Table 4 , column (8), top panel, to the inclusion/exclusion of individual and regional controls, using the IV estimation strategy. In column (1), we drop from the specification the set of individual and regional controls and we keep the regional and election fixed effects. Results are very similar both in terms of size and significance to those in Table 4 , column (8), top panel. In column (2), we include migration flows, measured as the change in migrants stocks between the most recent consecutive election years, as a control. The reason for including these controls is to check whether, recent acceleration of immigrant flows, besides their level, matters to Voters' preferences. These variables are not significant, and their inclusion does not make any difference in our results. In column (3), we include a baseline set of individual characteristics i.e. a dummy for female/male, a dummy for tertiary education and linear age. In column (4), we include the set of regional controls i.e. per capita GDP, population density, regional unemployment rate, and share of residents with tertiary education, without individual controls. Finally, in column (5) we include the complete set of individual and regional controls, so as to obtain our baseline specification.
Our main results remain stable across all the specifications. Among individual controls, being female, and having tertiary education are associated with voting for parties with a significantly less nationalistic agenda compared to being male or less educated, respectively. Age does not have any significant correlation with the intensity of nationalist vote. Among regional controls, the negative significant coefficient of unemployment and the positive significant coefficient of the share of residents with tertiary education signal that residents in better off regions, surprisingly, vote for more nationalist and Eurosceptic policy agenda. However, the effect of immigration on voting preferences is not related to regional level of unemployment/economic performance. This is shown in Tables A11 and A12 in the on-line appendix, where we test the effect of immigration on voting by subgroups on regional unemployment rate quartiles and variations. The negative and marginally significant coefficient of population density suggests that residents in more dense/urban regions in Europe have less nationalistic views.
[INSERT Table 7 HERE] In Table 7 we discuss the interaction between the possible relevance of regional public goods and the pro-nationalist voting behavior of individuals in a framework as described in equation (5). We look at three indicators of regional economic and social conditions: the value of per capita social benefits as a measure of welfare generosity; the ratio of children to adults as a proxy for the importance of schooling; and the total number of crimes in the region as a proxy for the value of public safety.
23 For each variable, we construct a dummy for regions above the median, and a dummy for regions below the median. In columns (1) and (4), we show the interactions with social transfer below/above the sample median. In columns (2) and (5) we show those with children-to-adult ratios below/above the sample median. Finally, in columns (3) and (6) we show the interactions with crime rates below/above the sample median. The first finding is that the point estimates of the high-skilled immigrants share is always negative and the effect of low-skilled immigrants share always positive on nationalism, in any set of regions. For social transfers and crime rates, the estimates are noisy and we cannot reject that the effect of high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants is the same for regions above and below the mean. However regions with high children-to-adult ratio show a stronger pro-nationalist shift in response to low-skilled immigrants and a weaker anti-nationalistic shift in presence of high-skilled immigrants. This suggests that in places where school crowding may be an important issue, citizens are more likely to be driven to nationalistic platforms in response to immigration. Those results seem to confirm the suggestion of Halla et al. (2017) , where the votes of Austrian citizens for their populist party are higher for municipalities where the concerns about the education of children was higher. Differences in level of crime do not seem a strong driver of different responses, confirming the results of Mendez and Cutillas (2014) .
24

Heterogeneity in Individuals' Voting Response
The baseline results implicitly assume that the effect of high and low-skilled immigration on citizens' voting is homogeneous across individuals. To allow for heterogeneous effects of migration across voters' individual characteristics, we run regressions on separate subsamples of citizens by their education level, separating tertiary and non tertiary educated, by age (grouping 18-37, 38-57, and 58+ together), by gender (male and female) and by place of residence, separating rural areas, cities, or small towns. We summarize these coefficients in figures rather than tables. 23 See the on-line Appendix I for details on source and construction of these variables. 24 Results with origin specific share of immigrants are available in Table A10 in the on-line appendix.
towards nationalism significantly more than more educated citizens, in response to less skilled immigration (top green line). At the same time, they are also pushed away from nationalism more intensely than highly educated citizens in response to high-skilled immigrants. One standard deviation increase in the share of low-skilled migrants raises nationalist voting by individuals without tertiary education by 1.04(= 6.1 * 0.17) that an increase in the number of migrants in a city, where exposure is already high, does not add much to the information set of local voters. Nationalist voting behavior of individuals living in towns is instead affected positively by low-skilled migration and negatively by high-skilled migration. This suggests that frequency of interactions or change in intensity in local news may play a bigger role in small towns. Voters in rural areas respond to low-skilled migration by voting for more nationalist parties, while they do not seem to respond to high-skilled migration.
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In modern parliamentary democracies, individuals reveal their political preferences for policy platforms only indirectly, by voting for parties whose political agenda cover multiple issues. For this reason we investigate to what extent the mechanisms highlighted into our baseline analysis and captured there by a constructed index, translate into actual voting for specific party groups. Figure 3 shows that Liberal and Radical Right party families stand at opposite sides of the nationalist political spectrum. The former group presents a policy agenda, which favors immigration, being open to economic, political and cultural Euro-pean integration. The latter group has often strong anti-immigration views, and rejects EU integration on the basis of sovereignty arguments and cultural claims. We thus estimate a linear probability model to analyze how migration affects voting shares to parties belonging to both groups. Results in Table 8 suggest that low-skilled immigration encourages voting for radical right parties, having no effect on voting for liberal parties. Symmetrically, high-skilled immigration encourages voting for liberal parties, while having no effect on voting for radical right parties. These effects are consistent with previous results and describe shifts towards the two opposite sides of the political spectrum in response to high and low-skilled immigrants.
[INSERT Table 8 HERE]
In Table A -5 in the appendix, we disentangle this effect further, and distinguish the voting behavior of tertiary and non-tertiary educated individuals. Results show that the effects of migration on the propensity to vote for radical right and liberal parties regards both tertiary and non-tertiary educated individuals in a rather similar manner.
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Effects on Turnout and on Longitudinal Individual Preferences
Baseline results in Table 4 suggest that low and high-skilled migration have opposite effects on voting for nationalistic political agendas. The repeated cross-sectional structure of ESS data that we used so far implies that these effects may be driven by two channels. The first one is voting turnout. Individuals with nationalist political views may respond to immigration by voting in larger proportions when more immigrants flow in.
The second one is change in individual preferences: if individuals change their views on nationalism over time, in response to migration, independently of their propensity to vote. Table 9 presents the estimated coefficients on the share of high and low-skilled immigrants on voters' turnout, defined as the probability of voting for individuals 18 years or older. The specification is similar to the one for nationalism, except that a dummy "voting at last election" is used as outcome instead of the nationalism index. Neither low-skilled nor high-skilled migration seem to be correlated with the propensity to vote at the elections. This is also true when we consider separate subsamples by individual education (tertiary and non tertiary) and age (18-37, 38-57, over 58+).
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As we discussed in the data section, information in ESS data also allows an investigation of the effects of migration on the change in individual preferences, by exploiting a longitudinal component of the data.
There are two specific questions on voting preferences of individuals i.e. "which party did you vote in the last national election?", and "which party do you (currently) feel close to?". Answers to those questions refer to different moments in time i.e. the year of last national elections, and the year of the survey interviews.
This allows us to estimate equation (9) and exploit variation over time in the voting preferences of the ESS respondent between the current year and the last national elections. Let us emphasize that we can collect the information on current political preferences for all people who voted at the last elections, independently if they would vote or not today. Hence, not only we control de facto for all individual characteristics by taking a within-individual difference, but, conditional on voting in the past elections, we also abstract from changes in the voting probability in the more recent period. Hence this exercise selects only changes in individual party preferences. The results shown in Table 10 confirm a positive and significant effect of the change in the low-skilled migrant share on change of individual preferences towards nationalist parties. This effect is more precisely estimated for less educated individuals, and driven by not European migrants. Both features are consistent with the estimates of repeated cross section. Moreover the estimated coefficients are not far from those in Table 4 . 29 Results also confirm the negative effect of high-skilled migration on nationalism, although this effect is not statistically significant. Caution is needed when interpreting these results. In general, a statement of current party preference may not be as strong as a measure of party voting at the last elections.
The way political preferences change since an election depends on the program implemented by the newly elected government. More importantly, individuals are better informed and more involved into party policy platforms when national elections are close. Their interests may be reduced in non-electoral times. This may generate a larger measurement error of preferences in the more recent period, which could result in an attenuation of the effects. The subsample we use for estimates in Table 10 is also smaller than our baseline sample, as only the 60% of individuals that voted at national elections, also responded to the question about party closeness. 30 With these caveats in mind, we can still say that results in Tables 9 and 10 are consistent with the view that the effect of migration on nationalist voting is mainly due to an individual preferences'
shift rather than a change in voting turnout of specific groups of voters.
Finally, to further document the plausibility of the preference shift in response to immigrants, we analyze the change in individual attitudes towards migration, reported in the ESS. In Table 11 we present results for the effect of skilled and unskilled immigrant shares on individual attitudes towards immigration. Specifically we consider some questions in the survey and we follow the existing literature (see e.g. Card et al. 2012) distinguishing assessments about the economic and the cultural desirability of immigrants. We also consider an overall assessment revealing the general view on the role of migration in a country. In columns (1)- (3), we analyze the effect of migrants' shares on individual evaluation whether migrants are good for the country's economy. In columns (4)- (6), we look at the effect on their assessment whether migrants enrich a country's culture. In columns (7)- (9), we analyze the effect on individuals' opinion whether migrants make a country a better place to live. We normalize each variable so that each one takes value between 0 (negative evaluation) and 1 (positive evaluation). The negative coefficients of migration shares suggest that higher migration is associated with more negative evaluations of immigration by natives. In particular, low-skilled immigration has negative and significant impact on the cultural and overall assessment while high-skilled immigration has generally non significant effects. The stronger effects on cultural rather than economic variables are consistent with a view in which "national values" come into play in affecting natives assessment more than economic effects. Results from individual panel analysis in Table 10 are consistent with the significant negative effects of less skilled immigrants on natives attitudes. Taken with the rest of the evidence, it appears that individuals are pushed to more nationalistic views by low-skilled immigration, while high-skilled immigration has the opposite effect. Additional results are available in the on-line Appendix IX, where we decompose the results by immigrants country of origin.
Simulations of Nationalist Voting Scenarios
Our results provide a new understanding of how local inflows of low and high-skilled immigrants interact with characteristics of local residents and affect their intensity of nationalist voting behavior. In particular the education level of European citizens turns out to be a very important factor in their vote response to immigrants. This is interesting and relevant from a policy perspective, as education policies and achievements will affect the politics of regions vis-a-vis immigration (see e.g. Braga et al., 2013) . In this section, we produce some simulation exercises based on our estimates. These simulations offer scenarios on the possible response of nationalism levels across European regions under alternative hypotheses regarding potential inflows of immigrants and potential education level of the local population.
We use as a benchmark the regional change in levels of nationalism (of voted parties) predicted by the coefficients on the skill specific migration shares estimated separately by education category (as in Figure 8 , panel (a)). We first feed into this prediction the observed changes in the stock of low-skilled and high-skilled migrants during the last ten sample years (i.e. over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] . In practice, we predict the regional P opr,05 ). Even though we could not include Italy and Greece in our estimations due to a lack of voting data, we include them in our simulations. By so doing, we assume that the response of their citizens is similar to that of other EU countries, and we can predict their simulated response as they are important immigration-recipient countries in the EU context.
[INSERT Table 12 HERE] In Table 12 , we report results from this simulation at country level. Results in column (3) show that, on average, the combination of natives' education and skill composition of migration flows in the last ten years increased nationalism levels in the EU. However there is a lot of cross-country heterogeneity. Column (2) shows country-specific average predicted effects, using the regional population as weights. The model predicts an increase in nationalism in countries characterized by relatively low share of people with tertiary education (e.g. Italy) and/or a prevalence of low-skilled migration (as in Belgium, Denmark, Italy). On the contrary, predicted nationalism decreases in countries such as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, as these are characterized by high shares of tertiary educated individuals (more than 30%) and more balanced inflows of low and high-skilled immigrants in the considered period. The share of tertiary educated people in the country is reported in column (4), and the 2007-2016 inflow of high-skilled and low-skilled as percent of the group is reported in columns (5) and (6) On the opposite side of the spectrum, we find areas that attracted many low-skilled migrants compared to high-skilled migrants. The rise in low-skilled immigration compared to high-skilled immigration increased the level of nationalism in regions as Basilicata (0.385) in Italy, West Midlands (0.614) in UK, and Syddanmark (0.470) in Denmark, where the rise of low-skilled immigration was more than 10 times higher than the rise of high-skilled immigration and the level of tertiary educated natives is not particularly high.
In Figure 10 we use our estimated model to simulate four alternative scenarios of nationalist responses to different migration outcomes. The first scenario hypothesizes a skill selective migration that allows highskilled immigrants and deters low-skilled immigrants altogether. This scenario is depicted in panel (a), and is obtained by setting ∆M LS = 0 in equation (11) (d) we simulate the effects of a similar education policy that increases everywhere the share of tertiary educated individuals up to 57%, which is the highest regional share in our sample (that we observe in Great London). Results are available in column (10) of Table 12 . Compared to simulation in panel (c), this policy somewhat moderates nationalism voting in some Italian regions and produces a significant reduction of nationalism in response to immigration in almost any place in Europe.
However, nationalism still increases in this scenario in some Italian regions such as Lombardy, Latium, Umbria and Emilia Romagna.
33 Overall, a more balanced immigration seems a good antidote away from nationalism vote. If politicians had the intelligence of promoting and encouraging high-skilled immigration in Europe they would have political support, likely, also for a certain amount of less skilled one.
32 For each region we do not change the size of the immigrants population, but we equally split between high and low-skilled migrants.
33 Country specific results not available in Table 12 are then available in Table A25 in the on-line appendix. Moreover, in the online Appendix X we perform other simulations and robustness checks. First, using only the statistically significant coefficients from our estimations, (i.e. keeping in equation (11) only not tertiary natives) we plot the results in Figure A3 Panel(a) . Second, in Figure A3 Panel (b) we plot the results using origin specific coefficients and migrants variation. Results are similar to our baseline. Finally, in Table A26 and Figure A4 we show the level of nationalism after our predicted variation. Interestingly, several regions that experienced a strong variation towards nationalism were originally less nationalistic.
In this paper we investigated the effects of different types of immigrant inflows on voters' political preferences and the effects of individual and regional (social and economic) characteristics on voting for nationalist parties.
We addressed these questions using a sample of elections in 12 European Countries, over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] and measuring the change in high and less skilled immigrants as shares of adult population in regions within those countries. In order to address more directly the connection between party-vote and nationalism, we classified each party on a common scale in terms of the intensity of their "nationalism", based on their political Manifesto. We linked this information to the current political preferences (in terms of party) and the vote in the last election, for a large sample of citizens in 12 EU countries. A skill-specific shift share based on the location of immigrants by country of origin in 2005 provides the IV to proxy exogenous changes in immigrants population. The significant differentiation in country of origin and skill intensities of groups of immigrants allowed us to estimate two separate effects for skilled and unskilled immigrants on residents' voting preferences.
We found a robust negative effect of high-skilled immigration, measured as share of the population, on the intensity of nationalist preferences in the vote of citizens. We also found an opposite and positive association of approximately the same magnitude between low-skilled immigration growth and citizen's nationalist preferences. We also uncovered that the change in preferences driven by immigrants is stronger for less educated citizen voters than for highly educated. While the main results are obtained using a repeated cross section of voting citizens, we found the same effects in longitudinal individual data on preferences for political parties.
We finally found that those results are mainly driven by a shift of voting preferences and not by an increasing vote participation of nationalist segments of the population in the national elections.
We also present a number of simulations regarding potential scenarios changing the educational attainment and migration flows in European regions. These simulations point to three main facts. Immigration policies producing more balanced inflows of low and high-skilled migrants would shift political preferences away from nationalist voting. These policies would not reduce immigration but re-balance it, allowing the pro-growth impact of immigrants. Second, closing borders to non EU migrants would also be associated, in most cases, with lower nationalist voting. However, it will forsake the benefits of immigration for the economy and the demographic decline of European regions. Finally, policies increasing the share of tertiary educated individuals may reduce nationalist voting in some countries, particularly Northern European countries. This is because college educated people tend to cast fewer votes for nationalistic parties, and their voting behavior responds less to changes in immigration. We hope these intriguing ideas will stimulate further research in this area. Years  Austria  2  2008, 2013  3  2010, 2014, 2016  Belgium  2  2010, 2014  4 , 2012 Denmark 2 2007 , 2011 3 2010 , 2012 Finland 3 2007 , 2011 , 2015 4 2010 , 2012 France 2 2007 , 2012 4 2010 , 2012 Germany 2 2009 , 2013 4 2010 , 2012 Ireland 2 2011 4 2010 , 2012 Portugal 3 2009 , 2011 , 2015 4 2010 , 2012 Spain 3 2008 , 2011 4 2010 , 2012 Sweden 2 2010 4 2010 , 2012 Switzerland 3 2007 , 2011 , 2015 4 2010 , 2012 United Kingdom 2 2010 , 2015 4 2010 , 2012 Note: Column (1) shows the number of elections available from ESS and column (2) the year of each elections. Column (3) shows the number of ESS rounds after 2010 by country and column (4) the year of each round. Source: ESS. 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 All 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 All 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 Share HS -0. 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 Regional old. Columns (3) and (6) distinguishes on the total number of crime. )  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  Time 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 Party (1), (2) and (3)) or to the Liberal political family (col. (4), (5) and (6)). The definition of the political family of parties is determined by the Chapell Hill survey dataset. )  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  Time 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 (2) and (3)) and age groups (col. (4), (5) and (6)). )  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  Time 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 .05, *** p<0.01. As NUTS2 controls we include the differences in GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population density and share of tertiary educated individuals. The dependent variable is the difference between our standardized measures of nationalism of the party that they feel close to and the party for which they voted for in the last national election. The analysis is performed with different immigrants shares: all migrants (col (1),(2),(3)), not European migrants (col (4), (5), (6)) and European migrants (col (7), (8), (9)). Moreover the analysis is performed on different samples of natives voters based on their level of education: all kind of education (col (1),(4), (7)), not tertiary education (col (2), (5), (8)) and tertiary education (col (3),(6), (9)). The estimation is performed trough an IV estimation procedure. The analysis is performed on subsamples by natives education: not tertiary (col. (1), (3), (5) and (7)) and tertiary (col. (2), (4), (6) and (8) )  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  Time 2010-2016 2010-2016 2010-2016 2010-2016 2010-2016 2010-2016 2010-2016 2010-2016 2010-2016 (1)- (3)), enrich country cultural life (col (4)- (6)) and make the country a better place to live (col (7)- (9)). Higher values imply positive attitudes. Note: authors' calculations on ESS, EULFS, Manifesto Project Database and Eurostat data. Column (1) the country averages of the regional differences in nationalism between the last and the first election available. Columns (2) and (3) show country averages and EU average, respectively, of the simulated standardized nationalism from the standard simulation using as regional weights the total population. Column (4) shows the country regional average of tertiary individuals. Columns (5) and (6) show the country average variation of migration share of HS and LS immigrants respectively over the 2007-2016 period. Column (7) shows the result of the simulation when we remove the variation of low educated immigrants. Column (8) shows the result of the simulation when we assume skill-balanced immigration. Column (9) shows the result of the simulation when we increase by 20% the share of tertiary educated natives by region. Column (10) shows the result of the simulation when each region has the same share of tertiary educated natives as the highest educated one in the same country. (11) at NUTS2 level when: the direct effect of tertiary education on nationalism is included (panel (a)), regional level of tertiary educated natives is increased by 20% (panel (b)), each region has the same level of tertiary educated natives as the highest region in the same country (panel (c)) and each region has the same level of tertiary educated natives as the highest in our sample (Greater London) (panel (d)). )  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  Time 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 )  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  Time 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 (4)), town or small city (col. (2)- (5)) and big city or suburbs of it (col. (3)-(6)). 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 2007-2016 Party (2), (3) and (4)) or to the Liberal political family (col. (5), (6), (7), (8)). The definition of the political family of parties is determined by the Chapell Hill survey dataset.
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